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Abstract 
Context effects in recognition tests are twofold. First, presenting familiar contexts at a 
test leads to an attribution of context familiarity to a recognition probe, which has been 
dubbed Ôcontext-dependent recognitionÕ. Second, reinstating the exact study context for a 
particular target in a recognition test cues recollection of an item-context association, 
resulting in Ôcontext-dependent discriminationÕ. Here we investigated how these two context 
effects are expressed in metacognitive monitoring (confidence judgments) and metacognitive 
control (ÔdonÕt knowÕ responding) of retrieval. We used faces as studied items, landscape 
photographs as study and test contexts and both free- and forced-report 2AFC recognition 
tests. In terms of context-dependent recognition, the results document that presenting familiar 
contexts at test leads to higher confidence and lower rates of ÔdonÕt knowÕ responses 
compared to novel contexts, while having no effect on forced-report recognition accuracy. In 
terms of context-dependent discrimination, the results show that reinstated contexts further 
boost confidence and reduce ÔdonÕt knowÕ responding compared to familiar contexts, while 
affecting forced-report recognition accuracy only when contribution of recollection to 
recognition performance is high. Together, our results demonstrate that metacognitive 
measures are sensitive to context effects, sometimes even more so than recognition measures. 
Keywords: Context, Metacognition, Recognition, Confidence 
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Both encoding information in memory and its later retrieval occur in context. Context 
can be understood as any type of information that accompanies encoding and retrieval but is 
not itself a target of either encoding or retrieval. In experimental studies on memory, a variety 
of conditions have been treated as context, ranging from mood (e.g., Eich, 1985; Eich & 
Metcalfe, 1989) to position of a word on a computer screen (e.g., Macken, 2002; Murnane & 
Phelps, 1993). Context has been investigated mostly to determine if reinstating study context 
at the moment of testing facilitates memory retrieval. A substantial number of studies 
document such beneficial effects of context reinstatement in recall (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 
1975; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978), but a somewhat more complex picture emerges in 
recognition, with some studies showing benefits of reinstating context for recognition 
performance (e.g., Geiselman & Bjork, 1980; Smith, 1985) and some showing no benefits 
(Hockley, 2008; see also Smith & Vela, 2001, for a review). In the present study we take a 
novel but complementary approach to investigating context effects in memory as we focus on 
how context present at retrieval affects metacognitive processes.   
The metacognitive approach to memory stresses that the process of remembering does 
not end when retrieval of information from memory is completed. When asked a memory 
question, people need not only gather information from memory. They need also to assess the 
quality of the products of memory retrieval and to decide whether this quality is sufficient to 
warrant reporting of the retrieved memory. According to the framework developed by Koriat 
and Goldsmith (1996), the processes of responding to a memory question start with 
generating a candidate answer based on information stored in memory. After the memory 
retrieval process is complete, the metacognitive monitoring process takes over and a person 
assesses his/her confidence that the product of memory retrieval (the candidate response) is 
correct. Finally, after assigning confidence to the candidate response, in the process of 
exerting metacognitive control, a decision is taken whether assigned confidence is high 
Context reinstatement and metacognition   4 
 
enough to volunteer the candidate response, or, alternatively, whether a ÔdonÕt knowÕ (DK) 
response to the memory question should be given. Critically, according to the Koriat and 
Goldsmith framework, the metacognitive processes are mixed with memory retrieval to shape 
memory performance in free-report tests (i.e., in tests allowing response withholding). This is 
so because in such tests omissions may reflect either failures to access appropriate memory 
information, or the state in which required information is accessible but confidence assigned 
to this information is too low to warrant its disclosure.  
Despite years of research on how retrieval context affects memory processes, the 
issue of whether metacognitive processes of monitoring and control are affected by changes 
in study-test contexts have not been systematically investigated. It is an important gap in our 
knowledge, since, as discussed above, metacognitive processes shape the contents of a 
memory report. If context present at retrieval were to affect how confident people are about 
the products of their memory processes, then, according to the Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) 
framework, it would also determine the probability of volunteering retrieved information in 
free-report memory tests, affecting the number of correct and incorrect details reported. Thus, 
for example, context reinstatement may benefit memory retrieval and at the same time make 
people more confident that the products of retrieval are correct, increasing the chances that 
retrieved details are disclosed. But it is also possible that context would affect metacognitive 
processes even when it has no effect on memory. As described in the next section, research 
on context effects in recognition identified conditions under which context present at study 
and later provided at test failed to affect recognition accuracy in forced-report tests. However, 
if context were to affect metacognitive processes under such circumstances, then it could lead 
to changes in free-report recognition output, demonstrating how context may exert influence 
upon memory performance via metacognitive, not memory processes. Such a demonstration 
was the main motivation behind conducting the present study. 
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In the present study we aim to investigate how changes in study-test contexts affect 
metacognitive processes. To this aim, we borrow the paradigm previously used to examine 
the effects of context reinstatement on recognition performance and we use this paradigm to 
investigate how study-test contexts determines confidence (metacognitive monitoring) and 
decisions whether to volunteer responses to a memory question or to respond DK 
(metacognitive control). In what follows, we first present an overview of the literature on 
context reinstatement in recognition and then we outline our predictions of how context may 
affect metacognitive processes.  
Context effects in recognition 
The most comprehensive work on context effects in recognition was conducted by 
Murnane and Phelps (1993, 1994, 1995) within the theoretical framework ICE (Item, 
Context, and Ensemble information) theory (cf. Murnane, Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999). 
According to this theory, when items are presented with context at study, three types of 
information can be encoded: a) item information, b) context information, and c) information 
specific to an ensemble created by an item and its context, to which we will refer here as an 
item-context association
1
. When, in a subsequent old/new recognition test, a studied context 
is re-presented together with a novel or old probe, it matches the stored context information, 
resulting in a feeling of familiarity. Familiarity of the context is attributed to the test probe, 
increasing the probability of an ÔoldÕ response. Importantly, this occurs whenever studied 
context is used in a test, independently of whether the probe it accompanies corresponds to an 
item studied in this particular context. The same effect on ÔoldÕ responses occurs both for 
                                                                                       
1
 In the present work we do not differentiate between a global-matching approach to recognition memory, as 
advocated by Murnane et al. (1999), and a dual-process approach promoted by other researchers (e.g., Macken, 
2002), as we believe that these two are quite similar in their descriptions of the context effects. In other words, 
from the perspective of our study, we do not see much difference between the concept of matching ensemble 
information to contents of a memory store and recollection of item-context associations. For convenience, we 
use the term of recollection of item-context associations in the present paper, rather than the global matching 
terminology of ICE. 
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targets studied in different contexts and for foils which were not studied at all. In 
consequence, studied contexts presented at test increase both hits to studied items, whether 
they were paired with this particular context or not, and false alarms to foils. This type of 
effect Murnane et al. dubbed context-dependent recognition.  
A different effect may sometimes occur when at test context is re-presented with the 
same particular item with which it was paired at study. In such a case, inclusion of both the 
item and its originally paired context in a compound cue may result in recollection of the 
item-context association. Recollection of this association also induces more ÔoldÕ responses. 
However, such a recollection necessarily occurs only for studied items and thus recollection 
of item-context associations specifically increases hits to old items but not false alarms to 
foils. This type of effect Murnane et al. (1999) dubbed context-dependent discrimination, as a 
specific increase in hits for targets means that participants are better at discriminating 
between targets and foils. 
 The empirical studies on context effects largely followed the directions outlined 
within the ICE theory. Hockley, Bancroft, & Bryant (2012) reviewed the results of a number 
of conditions employed in various studies on context effects in recognition and found that 
false alarm rates to foils tested in studied contexts are invariably larger than false alarm rates 
to foils tested in novel contexts, which supports the idea of context-dependent recognition 
(see also Dodson & Shimamura, 2000; Hockley, 2008). However, the issue of context-
dependent discrimination remains more controversial. To make a strong case for context-
dependent discrimination, a comparison is needed between a condition in which the exact 
context accompanying encoding of a given item is reinstated at test for this item (a reinstated 
context condition) with a condition in which a studied context is used at test in a novel target-
context configuration (a re-paired context condition). Such a comparison holds the familiarity 
of a context equal, eliminating the influence of context-dependent recognition, and thus 
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allows for revealing context-dependent discrimination. A study by Macken (2002) employed 
such a comparison in a remember/know paradigm and found evidence for context-dependent 
discrimination in recognition judgments accompanied by ÔrememberÕ responses (see also 
Tibon, Vakil, Goldstein, & Levy, 2012, for related results). On the other hand, a 
comprehensive investigation of context effects by Hockley (2008) showed that context-
dependent discrimination requires a specific orienting task at encoding. Only when 
participants were explicitly instructed to associate items with their contexts at study, did the 
hit rate in the reinstated context condition (and also the rate of ÔrememberÕ responses) exceed 
the hit rate in the re-paired context condition, indicating context-dependent discrimination. 
Thus, the study by Hockley suggests that the amount of attention devoted to encoding item-
context associations is crucial for the presence of context-dependent discrimination. When 
attention is not directed toward such associations, they are not very likely to be retrieved even 
when the exact context is reinstated at test, impeding the chances of documenting context-
dependent discrimination.  
 Several studies used faces, the stimuli adopted for the present investigation, as 
materials in research on context reinstatement (Kerr & Winograd, 1982; Watkins, Ho, & 
Tulving, 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977). These studies found indications of both 
context-dependent recognition (increase in false alarms with familiar contexts) and context-
dependent discrimination in memory for faces (as assessed either with corrected recognition 
scores or forced-choice recognition accuracy). Importantly, all these studies used associative 
instructions at study, designed to promote creation of associations between target faces and 
their contexts. Two more recent studies that examined context effects in memory for faces 
included a re-paired context condition, which allows for dissociating the effects of context 
familiarity and reinstating the specific item-context pairing. Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Masson 
(2007) used associative study instructions at study and found a higher hit rate in the re-paired 
Context reinstatement and metacognition   8 
 
context condition compared to the novel context condition and a higher false alarm rate to 
foils in studied contexts compared to foils in novel contexts, supporting the concept of 
context-dependent recognition. They also found an increased hit rate and the rate of 
ÔrememberÕ responses in the reinstated context condition as compared to the re-paired context 
condition, consistent with the pattern observed by Macken (2002) and also by Hockley (2008, 
Experiment 5B), and supporting context-dependent discrimination. Reder et al. (2013) also 
used associative study instructions but found no evidence for context-dependent 
discrimination for unknown faces (although such evidence emerged for famous faces). Reder 
et al. hypothesized that it could be particularly difficult for participants to create associations 
between unknown faces and context images that would later support recollection. These 
results underscore the point made by Hockley (2008) that documenting context-dependent 
discrimination is unlikely when creation of item-context associations at study is impeded. 
The present study 
 In the present study we asked how context-dependent recognition and discrimination 
affect metacognitive processes of monitoring and control of retrieval. We start outlining our 
predictions with context-dependent discrimination, which is a facilitation of retrieval of item-
context associations for reinstated contexts. Numerous studies have shown that metacognitive 
processes at retrieval are strongly affected by recollective processes (e.g., Bulevich & 
Thomas, 2012; Koriat, 1993). It is a straightforward prediction that whenever recollection is 
triggered by context reinstatement, participants should become more confident in their 
candidate responses, which should be reflected in both confidence judgments concerning 
forced-report responses (confidence should be higher when recollection is augmented) and 
also their decisions to volunteer candidate responses in a free-report test (more responses 
should be volunteered when recollection is augmented). Thus, in the case of context-
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dependent discrimination, we essentially predict parallel effects on memory and 
metacognitive measures. 
A potentially more interesting scenario arises for context-dependent recognition, 
where we predicted a dissociation of memory and metacognitive measures. The effect of 
context-dependent recognition occurs when context familiarity is attributed to a recognition 
probe, increasing both hits and false alarms in old/new recognition test but not affecting 
recognition discrimination. The question that we asked was whether context familiarity 
would also increase confidence in a candidate response and increase the probability that this 
candidate response would be volunteered. Our previous investigation of the effects of 
familiarity on metacognitive processes (Hanczakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka, & Mazzoni, 2013) 
suggests that familiarity that is irrelevant for recognition discrimination may nevertheless 
affect confidence and DK responding. In this study, we showed that when paired associates 
are studied and the recognition task requires indicating a target which was paired with a given 
cue, cue familiarity is attributed to a candidate response in a recognition test. This inflates 
confidence that this response is correct and makes it more likely that this response would be 
volunteered. Although the cue in the paired-associates task differs from context inasmuch as 
the cue is vital for the task at hand (choosing target associated with this cue), whereas context 
is not, we predicted that the effects of familiarity will be the same in these two scenarios. 
Thus, we predicted that context familiarity would increase confidence that a candidate 
response is correct and reduce DK responding, while having no effect on forced-report 
recognition accuracy. 
  To test our predictions, we adopted the paradigm used to investigate context 
reinstatement in recognition. In our particular version of the paradigm participants studied 
compounds of face and landscape photographs and their memory for faces was later tested 
with a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test with a context (landscape) 
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photograph placed between test stimuli.
2
 Three context conditions were investigated: 
reinstated context, re-paired context and novel context. A comparison of re-paired and novel 
context conditions speaks to the effects of context familiarity (context-dependent recognition) 
whereas a comparison of reinstated and re-paired context conditions speaks to the effects of 
reinstating the association between the test item and its context, while keeping context 
familiarity constant (context-dependent discrimination).  
Critically, we supplemented our 2AFC recognition test with a stage in which 
metacognitive monitoring in the shape of confidence was assessed, as well as with a stage in 
which exerting metacognitive control was allowed and participants could withhold a 
response. Thus, in each trial of the test, participants were presented with test stimuli (two 
faces and a context photograph) and they were first asked to indicate the studied face only 
when they were sure their response was correct and to respond DK otherwise (a free-report 
step). After that, they were asked to indicate which they thought was the studied face, even if 
it required guessing (a forced-report step). Finally, they were asked to rate their confidence in 
the forced-report response (see Hanczakowski et al., 2013, for this type of testing). The 
means of confidence judgments and the proportions of DK responses across conditions were 
our measures of metacognitive processes whereas the hit rate on forced-report recognition 
was our measure of memory retrieval processes (cf. Higham, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996).  
                                                                                       
2
 The 2AFC test was used here rather than the standard old/new recognition test in order to circumvent the 
problems of distinguishing between context effects on bias and discrimination. In the present study we were 
interested in examining context effects on metacognitive processes both when context affects participantsÕ 
ability to discriminate between targets and foils and also when it does not. Although numerous methods for 
deriving measures of discrimination on the old/new test have been proposed (some based on signal detection 
theory and some on multinomial processing tree models), there is currently no consensus on which of these 
measures appropriately distinguish between discrimination and bias to call any test probe ÔoldÕ. There is, 
however, a consensus that 2AFC tests are essentially bias-free (except for the left-right bias which is further 
discussed in footnotes 4, 5 and 6) and that any differences between conditions on such a test reflect differences 
in participantsÕ ability to discriminate between targets and foils.      
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To reiterate our general predictions as applied to the procedure used for the present 
study, we predicted that familiarity of the context (novel vs. re-paired context conditions 
comparison) will not affect forced-report 2AFC recognition accuracy but will determine level 
of confidence and the rate of DK responses.
3
 By contrast, we predicted that context 
reinstatement (reinstated vs. re-paired context conditions) will lead to parallel effects on 
memory and metacognitive measures. Thus, whenever context reinstatement is potent to 
augment retrieval of item-context associations and lead to context-dependent discrimination 
reflected in increased forced-report 2AFC recognition accuracy, this should also be reflected 
in increased confidence and reduced rate of DK responses. 
 
 Experiment 1 used the general procedure outlined earlier coupled with passive-
viewing instructions at study. The passive-viewing instructions can be described as non-
associative, as participants are not asked to attend to item-context associations. Under such 
instructions, previous studies have often failed to document context-dependent discrimination 
(see Hockley, 2008). Thus, in Experiment 1, under non-associative instructions we expected 
minimal effects of context reinstatement on retrieval of item-context associations and, 
accordingly, we predicted no differences between reinstated and re-paired context conditions 
in either memory or metacognitive measures. By contrast, we predicted that context 
familiarity would be attributed to candidate responses, leading to differences in 
metacognitive measures between re-paired and novel context conditions, while having no 
effect on the memory measure of hits in forced-report 2AFC recognition test. 
                                                                                       
3
 Note that our prediction of context familiarity increasing confidence differs from a common formulation of 
how confidence is shaped in 2AFC recognition, which assumes that confidence is a function of a magnitude of a 
difference in memory evidence for two test stimuli (cf. Clark, 1997). Context familiarity should not affect this 
difference. 
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 Fifty undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for course 
credit. 
 A set of 96 black-and-white photographs of faces (a 
mixed set with male and female faces in equal proportions, all of them Caucasian) from the 
Psychological Image Collection at Stirling and another of 64 black-and-white photographs of 
landscapes from various Internet sources were assembled. The set of faces was divided into 
two subsets (A and B) of 48 faces (with approximately equal proportions of male and female 
faces in both subsets). One of these subsets served as study material and the other as a source 
of foils for a recognition test, which was counterbalanced across participants. Each face from 
the subset A was randomly yoked with a face from the subset B and with an individual 
context photograph of a landscape. The yoking of faces was done without regard to the sex of 
the yoked faces, which meant that pairs consisting of two male, two female, and one male 
and one female faces were created.  
At study, faces were presented with their yoked context photographs. At test, both 
yoked faces were presented with a context photograph. If a studied face was assigned to the 
reinstated context condition, the context photograph presented at test was a photograph yoked 
with this pair of faces. If a studied face was assigned to the re-paired context condition, the 
context photograph presented at test was a photograph yoked with another pair of faces. If a 
studied face was assigned to the novel context condition, the context photograph presented at 
test was one of the 16 landscape photographs not yoked with any pair of faces. An equal 
number of studied faces were assigned to each of the three conditions (16) and this 
assignment was counterbalanced across participants. 
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The design had one independent variable manipulated within-participants: context 
condition (reinstated, re-paired, novel). Dependent variables of interest were: the rate of DK 
responses in free-report recognition, accuracy in forced-report recognition and mean 
confidence judgments in forced-report decisions. 
 In the study phase participants were presented with 48 images of a face 
together with a landscape photo. The images shared a border and the face was always 
presented on the right. Each face-landscape pair was presented for 5 s and participants were 
instructed to look at both photographs. They were also forewarned about an unspecified 
memory test. The test directly followed the study phase. Each trial at test included three 
steps. First, two faces were presented on a screen with a landscape photo between them. Half 
of the studied faces were presented on the left and half were presented on the right. 
Participants were instructed to indicate which of the presented faces, the one on the left or the 
one on the right, was presented at study. They were informed that a context photo may help 
them make this decision. They were further instructed that accuracy was crucial in this step 
and thus an additional option to respond DK was made available and they should use it 
whenever they were not sure of their response. Second, immediately after the free-report 
decision, the same set of photographs was presented and participants were asked to indicate 
the face presented at study even if it required guessing. Third, they were asked to provide a 
confidence judgment concerning the correctness of their response in the preceding, forced-
report step. The judgment was made by typing a value between 50 and 100 and participants 
were instructed that 50% corresponds to a chance level. The photographs were not presented 
on the screen during the confidence judgment stage of the test trial. All stages of the test were 
self-paced. 
 
Context reinstatement and metacognition   14 
 
 The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. We start with the presentation of 
forced-report recognition accuracy, which is assumed to reflect memory processes unaffected 
by metacognitive effects (cf. Higham, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). A one-way 
ANOVA on accuracy of forced-report recognition failed to reveal a significant effect of the 
context condition, F(2, 98) = 1.580, MSE = .022, p = .211, ηp
2
 = .031. No difference between 
novel and re-paired context conditions was expected as familiarity of the test context should 
not affect participantsÕ ability to discriminate between targets and foils. Of main interest, 
however, is that accuracy in the reinstated context condition did not differ reliably from 
accuracy in the re-paired context condition. Any such difference would indicate context-
dependent discrimination, which is better memory performance in the presence of the exact 
context that was paired with a given target at study. Such enhanced performance would 
suggest that reinstated contexts aided recollection of item-context associations. However, 
based on the previous findings (Hockley, 2008; Reder et al., 2013), we expected recollection 
to play a negligible role in our design and this null effect seems at first blush consistent with 
our expectations. One could note that performance in the reinstated context condition was 
slightly better than in the re-paired context condition, although this was not reliable even with 
a one-tailed t-test, t(49) = 1.378, SE = .029, p = .087, d = 0.196. 
 Turning now to metacognitive measures, a one-way ANOVA on the mean of 
confidence judgments in forced-report recognition decisions revealed a significant effect of 
the context condition, F(2, 98) = 28.032, MSE = 26.452, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .364. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that confidence was higher in the reinstated than in the re-paired context 
condition, t(49) = 3.408, SE = 0.998, p = .001, d = 0.486, and confidence in the re-paired 
context condition was in turn higher than confidence in the novel context condition, t(49) = 
4.701, SE = 0.912, p < .001, d = 0.668.  
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 A one-way ANOVA on the rate of DK responses in free-report recognition also 
revealed a significant effect of the context condition, F(2, 98) = 16.122, MSE = .015, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .248. Pairwise comparisons showed that the rate of DK responses was higher in 
the re-paired than the reinstated context condition, t(49) = 2.684, SE = .021, p = .01, d = 
0.402, and still higher in the novel versus re-paired context condition, t(49) = 3.224, SE = 
.026, p = .002, d = 0.463.4 
 The interpretation of the metacognitive results needs to be broken in two parts that are 
related to the issues context-dependent recognition and discrimination. Addressing first 
context-dependent recognition, we predicted that higher context familiarity in the re-paired 
than in the novel context condition would be attributed to a candidate response, inflating 
confidence and reducing DK responding compared to the novel context condition, in which 
context was unfamiliar. A comparison of the re-paired and novel context conditions supports 
our prediction. Thus, context familiarity, which does not allow participants to discern which 
of the test stimuli should be endorsed as previously studied, can induce in people more 
confidence that their candidate responses are indeed correct. In other words, the manipulation 
of context familiarity results in a confidence-accuracy dissociation by which context 
familiarity determines confidence in oneÕs candidate responses even though it does not affect 
the accuracy of these responses. 
                                                                                       
4
 In the study phase of all experiments reported here, face photograph was presented to the right of the landscape 
photograph. In all tests, the target faces within each condition appeared equally often to the left and to the right 
of the context photograph. In this way, any differences between conditions cannot be explained by participantsÕ 
bias towards the side on which faces were originally presented at study (i.e., right). To establish if participants 
were biased to choose faces presented on the right, we performed an additional analysis of forced-report 
accuracy with the side on which a target face was presented at test as a factor. If participants chose faces on the 
right more often, this should result in better accuracy when the target face was presented on the right. However, 
no such effect was observed as both the main effect of the side factor and the interaction with a context 
condition were not significant, Fs < 1. We also re-analysed the data for confidence and DK responding with the 
position of the target face as a factor but in these analyses the additional factor also failed to produce any 
reliable effects (lowest p = .66). 
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 Turning now to the issue of context-dependent discrimination, a comparison of 
reinstated and re-paired context conditions produced reliable differences in metacognitive 
measures which remain inconsistent with our initial predictions. We predicted that 
metacognitive effects for this comparison will track the effects obtained in the memory 
measure of forced-report recognition accuracy, but despite equal accuracy between reinstated 
and re-paired context conditions, we still found reliably higher confidence and lower rate of 
DK responses for reinstated contexts. In other words, the pattern of results for reinstated and 
re-paired conditions revealed yet another confidence-accuracy dissociation. Because 
reinstated and re-paired context condition are equated in terms of context familiarity, the 
metacognitive differences between these conditions necessarily reflect the influence of the 
specific item-context association re-presented at test in the reinstated context condition but 
not in the re-paired context condition. Hence, the metacognitive effects of reinstating context 
seem to reflect augmented retrieval of item-context associations, which affects metacognitive 
measures but not the memory measure.   
In formulating our initial predictions we assumed that the presence of context-
dependent discrimination speaks directly to the issue of recollection of item-context 
associations: when recognition accuracy in the reinstated (vs. re-paired) context condition is 
enhanced, this shows that item-context associations are recollected, but when accuracy is 
equal between conditions, this shows that associations are not recollected. The results from 
metacognitive measures demonstrate, however, that our logic was wrong and that the lack of 
context-dependent discrimination in the recognition accuracy measure (the proportion of hits 
in forced-report 2AFC test in our case) cannot be taken as evidence that context reinstatement 
does not affect recollection of item-context associations. What we missed in our initial 
reasoning is that recognition accuracy measure may simply be insensitive to changes in 
memory processes. If recognition performance can be supported by memory information 
Context reinstatement and metacognition 17 
 
other than recollection of item-context associations, for example by the relative familiarity of 
test stimuli, then augmenting recollection may fail to exert influence on recognition 
performance. At the same time, however, additional instances of recollection may induce 
more confidence in recognition choices. In this way, changes in recollection can be reflected 
in metacognitive measures, but at the same time be absent from memory measures. 
Returning to our main topic of metacognitive effects, we have argued that clear 
effects of context familiarity on confidence and DK responses (re-paired vs. novel context 
condition) reflect attributions of context familiarity to chosen responses, not any changes in 
memory for the test stimuli, as evidenced by equated recognition accuracy between these 
conditions. However, it is quite clear now that this comparable accuracy cannot speak 
directly to whether novel and re-paired conditions were equated in recollection. Thus, 
providing familiar context at test could still potentially facilitate recollection of item-context 
associations in the re-paired condition, an effect reflected in higher confidence and fewer DK 
responses but not in forced-report accuracy. Such a mechanism would be obviously different 
from our favored mechanism of context familiarity attribution. Thus, since the exact 
mechanisms driving the metacognitive effects described in the present experiment are still 
uncertain, Experiment 2 was conducted to further assess the basis of increased confidence 
and reduced rate of DK responses due to a provision of familiar context at test. 
 
The purpose of the present experiment is to demonstrate that the effects caused by 
context familiarity and by context reinstatement can be dissociated. Documenting such a 
dissociation would support our claim that differences in metacognitive measures induced by 
changes in context familiarity and by context reinstatement are caused by two different 
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mechanisms: attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response and augmented 
recollection of item-context associations, respectively. 
Our strategy in the present experiment was to further facilitate recollection of item-
context associations by using specific associative instructions at study. Numerous studies 
have found that with associative study instructions the effects of context reinstatement are 
revealed in the measures of recognition accuracy (e.g., Hockley, 2008; Watkins et al., 1976), 
presumably because directing participantsÕ attention to item-context associations enhances 
their encoding (Hockley & Cristi, 1996), at the same time increasing the probability of their 
subsequent retrieval. If our double-mechanism account of the results of Experiment 1 is 
correct, we would predict that stronger recollection would impact differently on a pattern of 
results caused by context familiarity and context reinstatement. In the case of context 
reinstatement (reinstated vs. re-paired context conditions), more recollection should result in 
better recognition accuracy in the reinstated context condition. In the case of context 
familiarity (re-paired vs. novel context conditions), more recollection should not lead to 
better recognition accuracy. At the same time, we predict that the pattern of results for 
metacognitive measures will replicate Experiment 1: recollection of item-context associations 
should create differences in confidence and DK responding between reinstated and re-paired 
context conditions, while attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response should still 
create differences in confidence and DK responding between re-paired and novel context 
conditions. 
 
  Forty-six undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for 
course credit. 
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  All elements of the present experiment 
were the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception in the study phase. After the 
presentation of each pair of images, participants were asked to rate how well a presented face 
fits its context photograph on a scale from 1 to 6. 
 
 The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A one-way ANOVA on the 
accuracy of forced-report recognition yielded a significant effect of the context condition, 
F(2, 90) = 3.639, MSE = .024, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .075. Pairwise comparisons showed that forced-
report recognition accuracy was higher in the reinstated context condition than both in the 
novel context condition, t(45) = 2.152, SE = .033, p = .037, d = 0.358, and the re-paired 
context condition, t(45) = 2.212, SE = .035, p = .032, d = 0.343. There was no difference 
between the re-paired and novel context conditions, t < 1. These results confirm our 
prediction that aiding recollection of item-context associations by facilitating their creation at 
study would selectively impact on forced-report recognition accuracy in the reinstated 
context condition. 
Turning now to the metacognitive measures, a one-way ANOVA on the mean of 
confidence judgments in forced-report recognition decisions revealed a significant effect of 
the context condition, F(2, 90) = 49.185, MSE = 28.463, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .522. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that confidence judgments were higher in the reinstated context 
condition as compared both to the novel context condition, t(45) = 8.28, SE = 1.24, p < .001, 
d = 1.233, and to the re-paired context condition, t(45) = 8.852, SE = 0.968, p < .001, d = 
1.318. The difference between the novel and re-paired context conditions failed to reach the 
level of statistical significance, t(45) = 1.572, SE = 1.108, p = .123, d = 0.236, although the 
judgments were numerically higher in the re-paired context condition.  
Context reinstatement and metacognition   20 
 
A one-way ANOVA on the rate of DK responses revealed a significant effect of the 
context condition, F(2, 90) = 24.408, MSE = .016, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .352. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that the rate of DK responses was higher in the re-paired versus reinstated context 
condition, t(45) = 4.765, SE = .023, p < .001, d = 0.724, and still higher in the novel versus 
re-paired context condition, t(45) = 3.179, SE = .023, p = .003, d = 0.46. 5 
The results for the measure of metacognitive control Ð DK responding Ð replicate the 
results of Experiment 1. Again, there are two effects here to discuss Ð a difference between 
reinstated and re-paired context conditions and a difference between re-paired and novel 
context conditions Ð which both need to be considered in light of the results of forced-report 
recognition accuracy. In Experiment 1 we could not conclude whether these two effects on 
metacognitive control stem from one or two mechanisms. The one-mechanism account 
postulated that our three context conditions differ in the strength of recollection which 
contributes to metacognitive processes. The double-mechanism account postulated that 
recollection determines the difference between reinstated and re-paired context conditions, 
while attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response determines the difference 
between re-paired and novel context conditions. The results of the present experiment settle 
this issue in favor of the double-mechanism account. In the present experiment, the difference 
in DK responding between reinstated and re-paired conditions occurred together with a 
parallel difference in forced-report recognition accuracy. This clearly points toward 
recollective underpinnings of this result. By contrast, the difference in DK responding 
                                                                                       
5
 For Experiment 2, we repeated the analyses of whether the side on which the target face was presented at test 
affected forced-report recognition accuracy. Again, the side on which target face was presented did not affect 
accuracy in any way, as both the main effect of the side factor and the interaction with the context condition 
were not significant, Fs < 1. Additional analyses of confidence and DK responding with the side factor revealed 
that the side on which target was presented did affect confidence (F(1, 45) = 6.47, p = .01, for the main effect of 
the side, with higher confidence if the target face was presented on the right), but not DK responding. Other 
effects involving this factor were not significant (lowest p = .34). We offer no explanation for the effect of side 
of target presentation on confidence, which failed to replicate in Experiments 1 and 3. 
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between re-paired and novel context conditions occurred once again without a trace of a 
difference in forced-report recognition accuracy between these conditions. This indicates that 
recollection of item-context associations, successfully strengthened in this experiment, is not 
responsible for the discussed metacognitive effect. Instead, it should be assigned to the 
mechanism of attribution of context familiarity to a candidate response. 
One unexpected feature of the present results is that a difference in the mean of 
confidence judgments between the re-paired and novel context conditions failed to reach the 
level of statistical significance. How should one interpret this apparent null result? One 
possibility is that participants were more confident about their responses in the re-paired 
context condition, but this was not picked up by the measure used in the confidence judgment 
task. We note here that just as recognition accuracy is only an imperfect measure of 
recognition processes, as the results of Experiment 1 clearly demonstrate, confidence 
judgments are only an imperfect measure of internal subjective confidence and thus insights 
from other measures are necessary to make inferences about these directly unobservable 
cognitive representations of confidence (cf. Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, Pasek, & Higham, 
2013). The results concerning DK responding, an alternative measure of metacognitive 
processes included in our design, certainly give credence to the claim that the discussed null 
effect is spurious. Re-paired and novel context conditions clearly differed in the rate of DK 
responses, and this difference is difficult to explain unless these conditions differed also in 
participantsÕ internal confidence assigned to candidate responses. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that the encoding instructions introduced in 
Experiment 2 diminished the effects of context familiarity on metacognitive measures. This 
could occur because under conditions of strong recollection participants could have largely 
stopped relying on familiarity to choose a target face. If participants rely less on familiarity 
when recollection is more readily available (under associative study instructions), then 
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presumably the role of context familiarity in shaping metacognitive processes also becomes 
limited, and thus is reliably present only for DK responses but not confidence judgments. 
Experiment 3 was designed to unequivocally answer the question of whether the 
metacognitive effects of attributing context familiarity to candidate responses occur when 
participants rely on recollection in the final test. 
 
In the present experiment we wanted to create conditions in which correct responding 
in a recognition test would be highly dependent on recollection of item-context associations. 
The main question addressed under these conditions would be if people still use context 
familiarity as a basis for metacognitive processes. If such an effect was documented, it would 
suggest that the null effect of context familiarity on metacognitive monitoring in Experiment 
2 was spurious. However, if again no effect of context familiarity emerged, consistent with 
Experiment 2 but contrasting with results of Experiment 1, it would suggest that the context 
familiarity effect on metacognitive monitoring is limited to conditions in which participants 
rely on familiarity as the basis of memory decisions. 
A secondary objective of the present experiment was to investigate whether 
associative instructions at study, used in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, are necessary 
for documenting the difference in the forced-report recognition accuracy between the 
reinstated and re-paired context conditions. To this end, we reverted to the non-associative 
instructions from Experiment 1, used in conjunction with our novel, recollection-driven test. 
In the discussion of Experiment 1 we have argued that recognition accuracy is not affected by 
context reinstatement under conditions of non-associative study instructions because 
recognition accuracy may not be sensitive to the effects concerning recollection. If this 
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reasoning is correct, then we would predict that in a recollection-driven test, accuracy would 
be affected by context reinstatement, even when non-associative study instructions are used.  
 To create a recollection-driven recognition test, a separate pre-study phase was added 
to the experimental procedure, in which all foils used subsequently in the recognition test 
were presented. Their presentation (without any context photographs) should more or less 
equate them on familiarity with faces presented in the actual study phase. In the test, 
participants were asked for each target-foil pair to endorse the face that was presented in the 
phase of the experiment in which faces were paired with context photographs. Because 
familiarity should be useless for this discrimination, the test required recollection of either 
temporal context of the experimental phase or recollection of a specific item-context 
association created at study (see Bodner & Lindsay, 2003, or Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 
1997, for similar procedures). We predicted that in such a recollection-driven test a difference 
in forced-report recognition accuracy between reinstated and re-paired context conditions 
would be obtained despite the use of non-associative instructions at study. The main question 
remained whether the metacognitive effects of context familiarity revealed in comparisons 
between the re-paired and novel context conditions (for confidence judgments in Experiment 
1 and for DK responding in Experiments 1 and 2) would be preserved in this recollection-
driven procedure. 
d 
  Thirty-six undergraduates from Cardiff University participated for 
course credit. 
  Materials and design were exactly the 
same as in Experiments 1 and 2. In the present experiment a pre-study phase was added at the 
beginning of the experimental procedure. In this phase, participants were presented with 
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faces which were subsequently used as foils in a recognition test. Each face was presented for 
2 s with passive-viewing instructions, without any reference to memory. The following study 
phase used the non-associative instructions from Experiment 1. The test phase was the same 
as in Experiment 1 and 2, except that participants were clearly instructed to indicate faces 
studied in the second phase of the experiment, the one in which faces were presented with 
landscape photos. 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A one-way ANOVA on the 
accuracy of forced-report recognition yielded a significant effect of the context condition, 
F(2, 70) = 8.82, MSE = .021, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .201. Pairwise comparisons showed that forced-
choice recognition accuracy did not differ between the re-paired and novel context 
conditions, t < 1, but it was higher in the reinstated context condition than both in the novel 
context condition, t(35) = 3.876, SE = .029, p < .001, d = 0.641, and in the re-paired context 
condition, t(35) = 3.533, SE = .038, p = .001, d = 0.563. These results closely follow the 
results of Experiment 2 and once again demonstrate that recollection of item-context 
associations is more successful in the reinstated compared to re-paired and novel context 
conditions. Importantly, these effects occurred despite using non-associative instructions at 
study. This once again indicates that participants encode item-context associations at study, 
even when they are not explicitly directed to do so, and that these associations can be 
retrieved at test when cued with reinstated contexts. The fact that item-context associations 
are automatically established at study is perhaps not surprising given the earlier literature 
speaking to this issue (e.g., Bancroft, Hockley, & Farquhar, 2013; Jou, 2010), although it 
should be pointed out that recently Reder et al. (2013) have argued that such associations 
may not arise for unfamiliar faces Ð a hypothesis which is refuted by our results. However, 
what our results mainly underscore is that even when such associations are created and their 
Context reinstatement and metacognition 25 
 
retrieval is facilitated by context reinstatement, such facilitation may not always be detected 
by standard recognition tests (see Experiment 1) but it is revealed when participants are 
forced to rely on recollection (see Macken, 2002, for similar arguments). 
 Turning now to the metacognitive measures, a one-way ANOVA on the mean of 
confidence judgments in forced-report recognition decisions revealed a significant effect of 
the context condition, F(2, 70) = 20.319, MSE = 36.995, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .367. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that confidence judgments were higher in the reinstated context 
condition than in the re-paired context condition, t(35) = 3.861, SE = 1.465, p < .001, d = 
0.645, and in turn higher in the re-paired than in the novel context condition, t(35) = 3.437, 
SE = 0.986, p = .002, d = 0.574.  
A one-way ANOVA on the rate of DK responses revealed a significant effect of the 
context condition, F(2, 70) = 15.166, MSE = .017, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .302. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that the rate of DK responses was higher in the re-paired versus reinstated context 
condition, t(35) = 2.794, SE = .031, p = .008, d = 0.489, and still higher in the novel versus 
re-paired context condition, t(35) = 2.934, SE = .029, p = .006, d = 0.405. 6 The results for 
metacognitive measures exactly replicate the results of Experiments 1 but differ from the 
results of Experiment 2 inasmuch as the difference in mean confidence judgments between 
re-paired and novel conditions was again reliable. Recognition performance in the present 
                                                                                       
6
 For Experiment 3, we repeated the analyses of whether the side on which the target face was presented at the 
test affected forced-report recognition accuracy. Interestingly, in this experiment a factor of side reliably 
interacted with the context condition, F(2, 70) = 5.15, p = .01. This interaction arose because participantsÕ 
recognition performance in the re-paired context condition was markedly better when face was presented on the 
right (M = .62) rather than on the left (M = .44), whereas no such differences emerged for novel (.55 and .56, 
respectively) and reinstated (.69 and .64, respectively) context conditions. This difference for the re-paired 
context condition could suggests that merely presenting a target face on the same side of a familiar context 
photograph as at study aided participantsÕ recollection. However, it remains unclear why such beneficial effect 
of the position reinstatement would be limited only to familiar contexts as the lack of a parallel difference for 
the novel context condition would indicate. The additional analyses of confidence and DK responding with 
ANOVAs including the factor of side failed to produce any significant effects involving this factor (lowest p = 
.28). 
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experiment necessitated the use of recollection and the results concerning the accuracy of 
forced-report recognition indicated that participants did rely on recollection. The fact that 
under these conditions differences in metacognitive measures (both confidence and DK 
responding) were reliably present between re-paired and novel context conditions indicates 
that context familiarity underlies metacognitive processes even in recollection-driven tests. In 
other words, the present results join the results for DK responding in Experiment 2 in 
suggesting that a null effect for confidence judgments observed in Experiment 2 was 
spurious.  
 
 In the present study we set out to assess the context effects on metacognitive 
processes. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, in the process of memory 
reporting in the 2AFC recognition test, context familiarity is attributed to a candidate 
response, inflating confidence judgments (Experiments 1 and 3) and reducing DK responding 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 3). This occurs without a change to forced-report recognition 
accuracy, and thus constitutes a clear example of a confidence-accuracy dissociation. Second, 
the effect of context familiarity on metacognitive processes is robust and occurs even when 
familiarity plays a negligible role as the basis of responding in a recollection-driven 
recognition task (Experiment 3). Third, metacognitive processes in the presence of reinstated 
contexts are also affected by recollection of item-context associations. When the exact study 
context is reinstated at test, it facilitates retrieval of item-context associations, further 
boosting confidence and reducing DK responding (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). Fourth, the 
effects of context reinstatement on recollection of item-context associations can be masked in 
the measure or recognition accuracy when the recognition task can be accomplished solely by 
the means of other memory information, like relative familiarity of targets and foils 
(Experiment 1). The contribution of recollection can be revealed either by strengthening 
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associations that could be recollected (Experiment 2) or by rendering performance in a 
recognition task reliant on recollection (Experiment 3).  
-  
Previous research on confidence judgments in a memory setting often touched upon 
the problem of a confidence-accuracy relationship. The question is to what extent confidence 
in memory choice tracks the accuracy of this choice. Numerous dissociations between 
confidence and accuracy have been documented, suggesting that confidence and accuracy 
partially depend on different processes. For example, in their seminal paper Busey, 
Tunnicliff, Loftus, and Loftus (2000) showed how low luminance of a tested face deflated 
retrospective confidence judgments for ÔoldÕ decisions, while simultaneously increasing 
memory performance when the studied face was also of low luminance. This result indicates 
that the higher the ease of processing of a face at test, presumably a function of luminance, 
the higher the confidence in ÔoldÕ decisions. Our results from the re-paired versus novel 
context conditions parallel these findings. Just as participants attributed the fluency of 
processing of a test face to fluency expected from the previous study episode for a given face 
in the experiments by Busey et al., participants in our study attributed the feeling of 
familiarity evoked by context to a test face. Both types of attribution inflated retrospective 
confidence, producing a confidence-accuracy dissociation, as in our study recognition 
performance was independent of context familiarity, whereas in the study by Busey et al. 
recognition performance depended on study-test match in luminance, not on test luminance 
alone. 
When discussing factors shaping metacognitive judgments such as retrospective 
confidence, it is important to distinguish between experience-based and theory-based 
processes (cf. Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). In short, a certain factor may affect 
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metacognition either because it changes peopleÕs subjective feelings about stimuli, or because 
people have a certain theory of how this factor affects their memory processes. Applied to the 
confidence-accuracy dissociation under discussion, we have argued here that the effects of 
familiar context on confidence stem from attribution of context familiarity to a candidate 
response, which would be an experience-based process. However, it is also possible that 
people have a particular theory according to which their memory responses are by and large 
more likely to be correct when made in a recognizable context. After all, the results of our 
experiments clearly show that context often does convey information that increases memory 
accuracy. Although we believe that the manipulation of familiarity is very close to the notion 
of experience-based processes, we do not wish to dismiss here the possibility that the effects 
of context familiarity may originate in participantsÕ lay beliefs about context-dependency of 
memory. The methods for distinguishing between experience-based and theory-based 
processes in metacognition are currently being developed (see e.g., Mueller, Tauber, & 
Dunlosky, 2013) and these methods may be used in the future to address this issue.  
 Turning now to a comparison of reinstated and re-paired context conditions, it is 
worth evoking a recent study by Reinitz, Sguin, Peria, and Loftus (2012; see also Reinitz, 
Peria, Sguin, & Loftus, 2011). This study demonstrated that although recognition 
performance for faces depends both on familiarity of a face and recollection of distinctive 
features of this face, recollection affects confidence to a greater extent than it does affect 
recognition performance, again leading to a confidence-accuracy dissociation. This 
observation is paralleled by our second example of a confidence-accuracy dissociation, 
documented in Experiment 1. In this experiment, a comparison of the reinstated versus re-
paired context conditions revealed that recollection strongly contributes to retrospective 
confidence, while leaving recognition performance mostly unaffected.  
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Together, our results concerning confidence confirm that recognition accuracy and 
retrospective confidence can often be based on at least partially distinct psychological 
processes, resulting in confidence-accuracy dissociations. We wish to stress, however, that by 
no means should this be taken to imply that confidence is always or even most commonly 
dissociated from accuracy. Our results from Experiments 2 and 3 show how recollection of 
item-context associations can at the same time shape confidence and recognition accuracy. 
This, contrasted with the results of Experiment 1, shows how the nature of confidence-
accuracy relationship is affected by the conditions of both encoding and testing. 
Response withholding in memory tests  
In our study we assessed not only metacognitive monitoring in the form of confidence 
judgments but also metacognitive control in the form of DK responding. The results for DK 
responding largely mirrored the effects observed with retrospective confidence judgments, 
with lower rates of DK responses when confidence judgments were higher and higher rates of 
DK responses when confidence judgments were lower. This pattern is consistent with the 
framework developed by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), in which metacognitive control in the 
form of DK responding is dependent on the products of metacognitive monitoring, reflected 
in confidence judgments. 
 Critically, the framework of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) describes how 
metacognitive control in the form of DK responding is related to memory performance. 
When participants are allowed to withhold responses in a free-report test, the ultimate 
number of correct responses reported (what Koriat and Goldsmith refer to as an input-bound 
measure of memory accuracy) depends not only the efficacy of memory processes but also on 
participants' willingness to volunteer the products of retrieval. Thus, differences in 
metacognitive processes between conditions can contribute to effects obtained with the 
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measures of the proportion of correct responses volunteered, sometimes even when actual 
memory processes are equated between these conditions. To illustrate this issue, we will now 
use the combined data from Experiments 1-3 to present additional analyses of novel and re-
paired context conditions.  
First, we focus on forced-report recognition accuracy, which provides the measure of 
memory processes that is uncontaminated by the metacognitive process of response 
withholding. A 2 (context condition: re-paired vs. novel) x 3 (Experiment: 1, 2, 3) mixed 
ANOVA on forced-report recognition accuracy yielded a significant effect of Experiment, 
F(1, 129) = 24.75, MSE = .037, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .277, which arose because recognition 
accuracy was best in Experiment 2 with associative instructions (M = .75, SD = .15, collapsed 
across context conditions), somewhat worse in Experiment 1 with non-associative 
instructions (M = .67, SD = .14), and much worse in Experiment 3 in a test that required 
contextual discrimination between study and pre-study phases (M = .54, SD = .12). More 
importantly, a main effect of context condition and the interaction were both not significant, 
Fs < 1, once more testifying to the fact that presenting at test context which is merely familiar 
but is not reinstated does not help recognition memory beyond presenting a novel context.  
Second, we focus on the measure of the proportion of correct answers volunteered out 
of all questions asked in the free-report recognition test. A 2 (context condition: re-paired vs. 
novel) x 3 (Experiment: 1, 2, 3) mixed ANOVA yielded again a significant main effect of 
Experiment, F(1, 129) = 10.526, MSE = .083, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14, paralleling the results of the 
forced-report recognition accuracy. The performance was again best in Experiment 2 (M = 
.48, SD = .20, collapsed across context conditions), slightly worse in Experiment 1 (M = .42, 
SD = .22) and worst in Experiment 3 (M = .28, SD = .19). Crucially, for the measure of free-
report recognition a main effect of context condition was also significant, F(1, 129) = 12.736, 
MSE = .017, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .09, as participants volunteered more correct responses in the re-
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paired context condition (M = .43, SD = .23, collapsed across experiments) than in the novel 
context condition (M = .37, SD = .24). This difference should not be taken to imply that 
memory was somehow better in the re-paired context. In the 2AFC recognition test any 
change in the rate of DK responses necessarily results in the change in the proportion of 
correct responses volunteered because participants can get the correct answer half of the time 
simply by guessing. In summary, although forced-report recognition data clearly points to 
equal recognition accuracy between re-paired and novel context conditions, the analysis of 
the proportion of correct responses in free-report recognition shows better performance in the 
re-paired context condition. These results clearly demonstrate that in a test in which response 
withholding is possible, the analysis of the proportion of correct responses can produce a 
reliable difference between conditions which are actually perfectly equated in terms of 
memory processes. 
 The analyses presented above may well have important consequences for our 
understanding of context effects in memory. At the beginning of the present paper we 
mentioned that the effects of context reinstatement seem to be more readily observed in recall 
than in recognition procedures. It is important to note, however, that recall procedures almost 
invariably allow for response withholding. When comparing reinstated and novel context 
conditions in recall procedures in terms of the proportion of recalled items, one is unable to 
separate memory and metacognitive processes. More items volunteered in the reinstated 
context condition as compared to the novel context condition may reflect better memory 
access due to context reinstatement, but may also at least partially reflect a greater propensity 
to volunteer retrieved answers when reinstated and thus familiar context is presented at test. 
Of course this metacognitive origin of a difference in proportions of recalled (and actually 
volunteered) answers is possible only if participants in recall procedures are prone to 
withholding some of the correct answers. It is worth pointing out, however, that previous 
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comparisons of free- and forced-report recall revealed that at least under some conditions 
people are quite likely to withhold answers that are correct (Higham, 2002; Higham & Tam, 
2005, 2006). If this occurs in studies examining context effects in recall, then the contribution 
of metacognitive processes to what have been described as purely memory effects of context 
reinstatement cannot be dismissed. This issue awaits further research with recall procedures. 
 
 Although our study was mainly designed to investigate context effects on 
metacognitive processes, it also provides insights into basic memory processes. This is so 
because metacognition in memory tasks builds on memory information. However, as we 
discussed earlier, this memory information may not be necessarily of the same type as 
information underlying memory performance. We see this occasional discrepancy between 
memory and metacognition as quite beneficial for memory researchers because it provides a 
window of opportunity for examining memory processes that are difficult to reveal by 
standard memory tests (see also Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012, for a similar approach).  
 The literature on context effects in recognition is mostly focused on the discussion of 
context-dependent discrimination. Researchers focused on recognition tests have argued 
whether reinstating the exact study context at test facilitates discrimination of targets and 
foils. The results in this respect are not entirely consistent, with some studies revealing 
context-dependent discrimination (e.g., Macken, 2002) and some failing to reveal it (e.g., 
Hockley, 2008). This discrepancy is also visible in our own study. Context-dependent 
discrimination was absent in Experiment 1, where forced-report 2AFC recognition was equal 
in all three context conditions, but was reliably present in Experiments 2 and 3, where forced-
report 2AFC recognition was clearly best for the reinstated context condition. These results, 
coupled with the pattern already observed in the literature, demonstrate that the question 
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concerning context-dependent discrimination should not be whether it occurs but when it 
occurs. Macken suggested that such effects are most likely to occur when recognition 
responding is based on recollection of specific associations, as revealed in ÔrememberÕ 
responses. Our own results support this conclusion as context-dependent discrimination 
occurred when the role of recollection was promoted by specific study instructions 
(Experiment 2), presumably increasing the proportion of recollection-based responses, and 
when the nature of the recognition test was changed to directly induce more reliance on 
recollection (Experiment 3). 
 Perhaps more importantly, our results demonstrate how the absence of context-
dependent discrimination should not be taken to imply the absence of recollection of item-
context associations. Based on the previous results and our incorrect logic, we initially 
assumed that the lack of effects of context reinstatement in recognition accuracy can be 
straightforwardly used to infer the nature of recognition processes. Our results reveal the 
precarious nature of such reasoning by demonstrating how recognition accuracy can be 
insensitive to memory processes occurring in a recognition test. This observation underscores 
the necessity of distinguishing between a cognitive process and the measure used to tap into 
this process. Although it may sound quite counterintuitive, it appears that recognition tests 
are not necessarily sensitive to processes involved in recognition. To the extent to which 
cognitive researchers are interested in cognitive processes, and not merely in their reflections 
in particular laboratory tasks, we argue that they should strive to use a variety of measures to 
assess cognitive processes. We believe that the examination of metacognitive measures may 
prove of further use in this endeavour. 
Context outside laboratory 
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 We will devote the final words of the present paper to possible applied consequences 
of our results. The issue of context reinstatement plays a prominent role in research on 
eyewitness memory. Indeed, the context reinstatement manipulation constitutes a vital part of 
the widely used and investigated protocol of eliciting eyewitness testimony Ð the Cognitive 
Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Our results, although obtained in a quite simplified 
laboratory procedure, may thus convey important information for this type of applied 
research. What our results contribute is a word of caution when considering the effects of 
context reinstatement techniques. It is certainly true that context reinstatement benefits 
memory, as demonstrated in numerous studies examining the effectiveness of different 
techniques included in the Cognitive Interview (e.g., Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009; Milne 
& Bull, 2002), as well is in our laboratory procedure. However, an issue that, at least to our 
knowledge, did not caught researchers attention is that familiar context may inflate peopleÕs 
confidence concerning their memory reports even when it has no power of augmenting 
memory. This is particularly problematic in the eyewitness context as confidence expressed 
by an eyewitness is a major clue that people use to assess the credibility of the eyewitness 
(e.g., Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Reinstating context can thus have an effect of 
increasing the perceived credibility of an eyewitness quite independently of any possible 
beneficial effect on memory. 
 The present experiment involved faces as to-be-remembered stimuli. This kind of 
stimuli is important for the eyewitness literature, which is often concerned with the processes 
involved in identifying culprits from line-up procedures. Interestingly, there are some 
indications that line-up identifications can be related to the issue of context-dependent 
memory. For example, Evans, Marcon, & Meissner (2009) showed that the accuracy of line-
up identifications can be improved if context reinstatement techniques are implemented. The 
present study chimes with these conclusions by showing that contextual associations are 
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created for faces even without voluntary encoding, which are the conditions of most 
relevance to eyewitness scenarios, and that retrieval of these associations can be facilitated by 
context reinstatement. However, our results can be used to pose yet another question for the 
eyewitness identification research. Specifically, if context familiarity inflates participantsÕ 
confidence in candidate responses and makes them more likely to volunteer these responses, 
then the question arises whether context familiarity would also make people more willing to 
choose from a line-up. In other words, would context reinstatement techniques affect 
peopleÕs bias to identify their Ôbest choiceÕ in the line-up? Despite the fact that our laboratory 
procedure differs in number of ways from the line-up studies (e.g., number of faces used, the 
nature of a memory choice), this seems to be an important avenue for follow-up 
investigations, given the importance of identification bias in real-life scenarios (cf. Mickes, 
Flowe, & Wixted, 2012). 
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Table 1. Recognition accuracy on a forced-report test, mean of retrospective confidence 
judgments for forced-report recognition decisions and the rate of ÔdonÕt knowÕ (DK) 
responses on a free-report test as a function of the context condition in Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3. Standard errors of the means are given in parentheses. 
  Context condition 
  Novel Repaired Reinstated 
Experiment 1      
  Forced-report accuracy .66 (.02) .67 (.02) .71 (.02) 
  Confidence 66.68 (1.37) 70.97 (1.25) 74.37 (1.30) 
  DK responding .46 (.04) .38 (.03) .32 (.03) 
Experiment 2      
  Forced-report accuracy .75 (.02) .75 (.03) .83 (.02) 
  Confidence 68.44 (1.63) 70.18 (1.44) 78.75 (1.45) 
  DK responding .43 (.04) .36 (.03) .25 (.03) 
Experiment 3      
  Forced-report accuracy .55 (.03) .53 (.03) .66 (.02) 
  Confidence 61.87 (1.75) 65.26 (1.62) 70.91 (1.64) 
  DK responding .57 (.05) .49 (.04) .40 (.04) 
 
 
 
